How does innovation consortium promote low-carbon agricultural technology innovation: An evolutionary game analysis

发布时间：2023年1月

作者：lJianli Luo, Mingjun Hu, Minmin Huang, Yanhu Bai

单位：School of Business, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou, China

期刊：Journal of Cleaner Production

Volume 384, 15 January 2023, 135564

摘要：Low-carbon agriculture is a crucial component of sustainable development; technological innovation is the cornerstone of the agricultural transformation towards low-carbon production. This study developed a tripartite evolutionary game model for agricultural enterprise, university, and the government. It examined the low-carbon technology innovation of the agricultural innovation from an innovation consortium’s perspective, considering the dilemma that China’s low-carbon agriculture development faces owing to the lack of a single subject’s innovation capability. The simulation’s outcomes indicated: (1) The increase in collaborative innovation revenue, default costs (three–six times), and additional social benefits of collaborative innovation effectively promoted the evolutionary game results to (1,1,1), which means agricultural enterprises and universities choose collaborative innovation, and the government chooses to provide subsidies; (2) Enhancing innovation subsidies influenced game outcomes to a certain degree, but the effect was limited. The findings provide theoretical basis for government to enact policies to promote scientific and technological progress and to develop low-carbon agriculture.

关键词：Evolutionary game；Agriculture；Innovation consortium；Technological innovation；Low-carbon

链接：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.135564