经济学院发展经济学研讨会2024年第12期（总第111期）-张培刚发展研究院

摘要：This paper examines the repercussions of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing the distress of a city-level commercial bank. This shift resulted in a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis pinpoints a novel contagion mechanism driven by reduced confidence in bank bailouts, which contributed to the subsequent collapse of several other small banks. However, the erosion of confidence in government guarantees also improved price efficiency and credit allocation while discouraging risk-taking among small banks.

嘉宾介绍：周臻博士现任清华大学五道口金融学院副教授，博士生导师，清华大学五道口金融学院货币政策与金融稳定研究中心副主任。他于2016年毕业于纽约大学，取得经济学博士学位。在此之前，他获得了清华大学的经济学硕士学位和复旦大学经济学学士学位。周臻现阶段的主要研究领域是信息经济学的理论研究以及其在金融中介与银行监管、公司金融、宏观经济等领域的运用。他在American Economic Review，Journal of Economic Theory，Games and Economic Behavior等一流学术期刊上发表过多篇论文。他的研究成果曾经获得中国信息经济学会优秀成果奖，创新成果奖，中国信息经济学乌家培资助计划，PwC 3535论坛年度最佳论文等荣誉，并入选国家高层次人才（青年）计划。