经济学院2024年数字经济系列讲座第七期（总第32期）-张培刚发展研究院

内容提要：Personal data protection regulations typically require a seller to obtain consumers' explicit consent before processing their information. We model this requirement as an anonymous option, allowing consumers to maintain their anonymity when purchasing a product from a seller. We analyse a monopolist's incentive to offer such an option in a two-period model of repeated purchases and limited commitment. Although collecting consumer information implies full surplus extraction in the second period, the seller is better off by offering the anonymous option. This is because it enables the seller to commit to a high second-period price for unrecognized consumers and prevents the consumers from strategically delaying consumption in the first period. In contrast, consumers are worse off because of increased prices and reduced demand, and this result holds when consumers' intrinsic privacy concerns are private information. Consequently, privacy regulations mandating a compulsory anonymous option may fail to protect consumers' welfare.

中文摘要：个人数据保护法规通常要求卖方在处理消费者信息之前获得消费者的明确同意。我们将这一要求建模为一个匿名选项，允许消费者在购买产品时保持匿名。我们在一个重复购买和有限承诺的两期模型中分析了垄断者提供此类选项的动机。尽管收集消费者信息意味着在第二期可以完全提取剩余价值，但卖方通过提供匿名选项更有利。这是因为它使卖方能够承诺给未被识别的消费者一个较高的第二期价格，并阻止消费者在第一期策略性地延迟消费。相反，消费者会因价格上涨和需求下降而受到损害，而且即使消费者的内在隐私关切是私人信息，这个结果也是成立的。因此，强制性匿名选项的隐私法规可能无法保护消费者的福利。

讲座嘉宾简介：李建培，对外经济贸易大学经济学教授、博士生导师。主要从事产业组织和契约理论研究，研究题目包括团队生产中的锦标赛机制、最优采购契约的设计、专家市场契约设计、差别定价等。多篇论文发表于经济学国际顶尖期刊，包括RAND Journal of Economics(x3), Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics(x2)，International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization，Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Social Choice and Welfare等。先后主持国家社科基金、国家自科基金及霍英东教育基金会研究项目，并荣获2018年中国信息经济学乌家培奖。担任国际学术期刊Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design副主编。