经济学院2023年数字经济系列讲座（十三）

讲座题目：Optimal Move Order in Two-Player Tullock Contests

主讲嘉宾：王哲伟 教授 （山东大学）

讲座时间：2023年6月26日（周一）上午10：00--12：00

讲座地点：华中科技大学经济学院402室

内容提要：This paper studies the optimal design of contestants' move order in a two-player Tullock contest, in which a full range of the contest's accuracy and players' asymmetry is allowed. First, we provide a complete equilibrium analysis for sequential-move contests. We find that an equilibrium is either interior (both players are active) or preemptive (only the leader is active). In a strong-lead sequential contest, there is a preemptive (resp. interior) equilibrium when the contest is sufficiently accurate (resp. noisy); in a weak-lead sequential contest, a preemptive equilibrium only exists when the players' asymmetry level is low. Building upon the equilibrium analysis, we proceed to explore the contest format that maximizes the total effort among three formats: simultaneous, weak-lead, and strong-lead sequential contests. Our results indicate that a strong-lead sequential contest is optimal when the contest is significantly noisy, but can be dominated otherwise. Surprisingly, a weak-lead sequential contest can be optimal if the weak leader chooses to preempt the strong follower in equilibrium.

中文摘要：

本文研究了在充分考虑比赛精度和棋手不对称的情况下，两棋手Tullock比赛中棋手走法顺序的优化设计问题。首先，我们对序棋博弈进行了完整的均衡分析。我们发现均衡要么是内部的(双方都是主动的)，要么是先发制人的(只有领导者是主动的)。在强领先的连续比赛中，有一种先发制人的做法。内部)平衡时，竞争是足够准确的(见。嘈杂的);在弱领先顺序竞争中，只有当参与者的不对称水平较低时，才存在先发制人的均衡。在均衡分析的基础上，我们继续探索三种竞赛形式中使总努力最大化的竞赛形式:同步、弱领先和强领先的顺序竞赛。我们的研究结果表明，当竞争有明显的噪声时，强领先顺序竞争是最优的，但在其他情况下可以占主导地位。令人惊讶的是，如果弱势领导者选择在均衡状态下抢占强势追随者的先机，那么弱势领导者的顺序竞争可能是最优的。

讲座嘉宾简介：

山东大学经济学院教授，博士生导师。入选山东省泰山学者青年专家、山东大学齐鲁青年学者、仲英青年学者等人才项目。在Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Journal of Mathematical Economics等国际权威期刊发表论文十余篇。担任Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Public Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Economic Theory、《经济学（季刊）》等十余本国内外权威期刊审稿人。主持多项国家级项目；参与多项国家自科、社科重大项目。担任国家自科、社科、留基委项目评审专家。